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1. Introduction 
 
On 30 October 2016, the Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau 
and the Presidents of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and of the 
European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, signed the ‘Comprehen-
sive Economic and Trade Agreement’ (CETA) between the EU and Can-
ada.1 After the signature of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agree-
ment2 on 4 February 2016 CETA is the second of the so-called ‘mega-
regionals’ that cleared the first hurdle on the way to its entry into force. 
Whereas the ratification process for both is not yet finished,3 parts of 
CETA are already provisionally applicable.4  
CETA represents a new kind of trade agreement, which is called 
‘WTO plus’5 because its commitments go beyond what is already agreed 
 
* Scientific Coordinator of the European Research Centre for Economic and Finan-
cial Governance (EURO-CEFG) of the Universities of Leiden, Delft and Rotterdam and 
Researcher at the Department of International and European Union law at Erasmus 
School of Law Rotterdam. I would like to thank Federica Violi, Alessandra Arcuri and 
the editors of the journal for insightful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the 
one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part [2017} OJ L 
11/23; Joint Interpretative Instrument on CETA [2017] OJ L 11/3; Council Decision 
(EU) 2017/37 on the signing of CETA [2017] OJ L 11/1. 
2 Participating states are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States (until 23 January 2017) and Vietnam. 
For the text of the TPP Agreement see <www.tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text>. 
3 TPP was ratified by Japan on 20 January 2017 and by New Zealand on 11 May 
2017. CETA is not yet ratified by any of the signatory parties. 
4 Council Decision (EU) 2017/38 on the provisional application of CETA [2017] OJ 
L 11/1080. 
5 PT Stoll, ‘Mega-Regionals: Challenges, Opportunities and Research Questions’ in 
T Rensmann (ed), Mega-Regional Trade Agreements (Springer 2017) 3, 5. 
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on in areas that are also covered by WTO agreements, and ‘WTO more’6 
because it covers fields that are not yet regulated by the WTO such as 
investment protection, competition policy, labour standards, environ-
ment and sustainable development. It focuses on non-tariff barriers, in-
vestment flows, value chains and regulatory cooperation rather than on 
tariffs and quantitative restrictions for goods and services. At a very ab-
stract level, comprehensive trade agreements such as CETA embody a 
shift of focus from barriers that materialise in a (indirectly) discrimina-
tory manner at the border to barriers that occur in a (mostly) non-dis-
criminatory manner behind the border.7 Being a fully-fledged representa-
tive of the new kind of comprehensive trade agreements between major 
economic regions, CETA merits special attention in order to assess the 
direction into which international trade law is currently evolving. 
The present contribution wants to dedicate a part of this special at-
tention to the governance structure of CETA. Another important feature 
of the new kind of trade agreements CETA is representing is namely the 
intention of the contracting parties to make it ‘living agreement’.8 In or-
der to achieve this goal, a governance structure has to be established and 
to be equipped with decision-making powers in relation to issues that are 
either very dynamic on the global markets or very sensitive for the con-
tracting parties. After a description of the CETA governance (section 2) 
and an interim legal assessment of proposed structure and its decision-
making rights (section 3), CETA governance will be reflected against a 
broader background, which is defined by the very purpose of the creation 
of treaty bodies (section 4) and the need to regulate economic globalisa-
tion (section 6). Embedding the assessment of CETA into this broader 
picture (section 5) will reveal the main challenge ‘mega-regionals’ will 
have to meet and that is only little addressed by CETA, which is to ensure 
democratic legitimacy of a dynamised regulation of international trade 
relations (section 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
6 ibid 5. 
7 See in more detail infra section 6. 
8 Stoll (n 5) 9. 
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2.  Governance of CETA 
 
The governance of CETA is built on the CETA Joint Committee (Ar-
ticle 26.1). This committee is composed of representatives of the EU and 
of Canada and co-chaired by the Minister for International Trade of Can-
ada and the EU Trade Commissioner ‘or their respective designees’. It ‘is 
responsible for all questions concerning trade and investment between the 
parties and the implementation and application of [CETA]’. Under the 
auspices of the CETA Joint Committee there will be the following eleven 
specialised committees dealing with specific detailed issues in relation to 
the Treaty chapter for which they will be responsible: 
– the Committee on Trade in Goods, 
– the Committee on Services and Investment, 
– the Joint Committee on Mutual Recognition of Professional Qual-
ifications, 
– the Joint Customs Cooperation Committee, 
– the Joint Management Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, 
– the Committee on Government Procurement, 
– the Financial Services Committee, 
– the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, 
– the Regulatory Cooperation Forum, 
– the CETA Committee on Geographical Indications, 
– the Joint Sectoral Group (concerning good manufacturing prac-
tices for pharmaceutical products. 
The technocratic nature of these specialised committees is reflected 
by the rules on their composition, according to which ‘all the competent 
authorities for each issue on the agenda are represented, as each party 
deems appropriate, and […] each issue can be discussed at the adequate 
level of expertise’ (Article 26.2(5)). Remarkably, CETA confers upon 
these bodies the power to adopt decisions that are binding upon the con-
tracting parties (Articles 26.1(4)(e), 26.3 for the CETA Joint Committee, 
Article 26.2(4) for specialised committees) and to amend the Treaty (Ar-
ticle 26.1(5)(c)). Particular attention will be given in the following to 
these powers. 
Regarding the Treaty amendments, CETA provides for a general 
power for the CETA Joint Committee to amend the Treaty protocols and 
annexes (Article 30.2). This power is, however, not available for 
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amendments to Annex I, which contains ‘grandfathering clauses’ 
excluding the application of the market access, the most-favoured 
nations- and non-discrimination rules under CETA to the enlisted non-
conforming measures, to Annex II, which excludes also the future 
introduction of or changes to existing non-conforming measures within 
the enlisted fields from the application of the just mentioned CETA rules, 
and to Annex III, which specifies non-conforming measures excluded 
from the financial services chapter (chapter 13). It does also not include 
amendments to the annexes concerning investment (chapter 8), 
cross-border trade in services (chapter 9), temporary entry and stay of 
natural persons for business purposes (chapter 10) and financial services 
(chapter 13). All other annexes and protocols can be amended by the 
CETA Joint Committee. More specifically, in the field of customs duties 
on imports, a committee’s decision to accelerate or broaden the scope of 
the elimination of custom duties supersedes what was agreed on in the 
respective annex (Article 2.4(4)). Furthermore, the CETA Joint 
Committee can extend the scope of certain rules in CETA. Notably, in 
the field of investment protection (chapter 8), it can add other categories 
than the one mentioned in the defintion in Article 8.1 to the intellectual 
property rights covered by the investment chapter or it can add new 
categories of measures that are considered a breach of the ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ obligation in Article 8.10(2). This is remarkable 
since, as mentioned, Article 30.2(2) excluded the annexes of the 
investment chapter from the general power conferred upon the CETA 
Joint Committee to amend the protocols and annexes of CETA.9 
Amongst the specialised committees, the Joint Management 
Committee for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures is allowed to amend 
the annexes to the SPS chapter (chapter 5) of CETA (Article 5.14(2)(d)) 
following a yearly review of the annexes, which is to be made ‘in the light 
of progress made under the consultations provided for under this 
 
9 Difficult to understand, against this background, is the special rule in art 20.22, 
according to which the CETA Joint Committee may amend Annex 20-A by adding or 
removing geographical indications. This possibility would already be covered by the 
general power under art 30.2 since Annex 20-A is, in contrast to the annexes to ch 8, not 
excluded from it. This raises the concern that, by mentioning this particular amendment 
right explicitly, the amendment procedure diverges from the general procedure, which 
provides for an approval by the parties so that amendments to Annex 20-A could be 
adopted by the CETA Joint Committee without subsequent approval by the parties. 
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Agreement’. The other specialised committees may ‘only’ propose 
amendments to the CETA Joint Committee.  
Regarding decision-making powers, the main area, in which the CETA 
Joint Committee can take decisions, is dispute resolution. The committee 
appoints the members of the investment tribunal as well as of the appelate 
mechanism and establishes a list of arbitrators where necessary, it 
determines the fees and whether members should receive a salary, it 
decides on administrative and organisational issues when setting up the 
appelate mechanism. Most notably, it adopts ‘interpretations of the 
provisions of this Agreement, which shall be binding on tribunals 
established under [this Treaty]’ (Articles 8.31(3), 26.1(5)(c)). Furthermore, 
the committee can initiate non-binding ‘bilateral dialogues’ of the parties 
on sensitive policy issues (Article 25.1(2)) and ‘change or undertake the 
task assigned to a dialogue or dissolve a dialogue‘ (Article 25.1(4)). 
Amongst the specialised committees, the SPS Joint Management 
Committee decides whether the notification and information obligations 
of the parties in relation to SPS measures were fulfilled (Article 5.11(3)), 
the Committee on Services and Investment adopts a code of conduct for 
the members of the investment tribunal (Article 8.44(2)) and the Joint 
Committee on Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications adopts a 
mutual recognition agreement in relation to specific professional 
qualifications (Article 11.3(6)). It is worth mentioning that the Regulatory 
Cooperation Forum has no decision-making powers. Regulatory 
cooperation is based on a voluntary participation of the contracting parties 
(Article 21.2(6)). If a party refuses to cooperate or withdraws from a 
regulatory cooperation it is only subject to an explanation obligation of its 
decision. 
In procedural terms, amendments to the Treaty adopted by the CETA 
Joint Committee are, under the general rule of Article 30.2(2), subject to 
an approval by the parties ‘in accordance with their respective internal 
requirements and procedures necessary for the entry into force of the 
amendment’.10 The same applies to the specific powers to amend the 
 
10 It is worth mentioning that the wording of art 30.2(2) contains some ambiguity as 
to whether the approval by the parties is obligatory since it provides that ‘Parties may 
approve the CETA Joint Committee’s decision [emphasis added]’. The use of the word 
‘may’ could imply that parties’ approval is only facultative. Yet, the use of the word ‘may’ 
has rather to be understood as referring to a party’s discretion not to approve a decision 
of the CETA Joint Committee (in contrast to ‘shall approve’). This understanding is 
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Treaty text foreseen by CETA for both the CETA Joint Committee and 
the specialised committees with the notable exception of Article 8.1 
(extending the scope of intellectual property rights covered by the 
investment chapter) and Article 20.22 (modifying geographical 
indications). Whereas with regard to the latter, it could be argued that 
modifying geographical indications remains an amendment to an annex so 
that the general rule of Article 30.2(2) applies, the former is an amendment 
to the Treaty text, which is, according to Article 30.2(1) an exclusive right 
of the parties, so that it seems to be an explicit exception to the rule 
empowering the CETA Joint Committee to amend the Treaty without 
subsequent approval. In any event, it should be noted that the CETA Joint 
Committee only adopts decisions ‘by mutual consent’ (Article 26.3(3)). 
Therefore, representatives of the parties can always veto committee 
decisions at the committee level.11 
With a view to the exercise of decision-making rights, Article 26.3(2) 
sets the general procedural rule, according to which decisions by the 
CETA Joint Committee are binding upon the parties ‘subject to the 
completion of any necessary internal requirements and procedures’. 
 
supported by the third sentence of art 30.2(2), which requires a parties’ agreement on the 
date of the entry into force of the amendment (see K Groh, ‘Verfassungswidrige 
Einzelaspekte im Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement zwischen der EU und 
Kanada (CETA)’ (July 2016) 24). The present understanding is further supported by the 
fact that the EU did not adopt a decision based on art 218(7) TFEU when signing CETA 
(as it did in relation to the association agreement with Ukraine, Council Decision (EU) 
2017/1247 [2017] OJ L 181/1). This would have been necessary if art 30.2(2) had 
provided for a simplified treaty amendment procedure, in which a treaty body could 
decide on the modification. According to this provision the Council has to authorise the 
European Commission to ‘approve on the Union’s behalf modifications to the agreement 
where it provides for them to be adopted by a simplified procedure or by a body set up 
by the agreement’. In the absence of a decision under art 218(7) TFEU, an international 
agreement may only be modified with the procedure that governed its conclusion (see P 
Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart 2015) 154-155). 
11 Since CETA is a so-called mixed agreement that also affects policy fields covered 
by Member States’ competences, it should be noted that the Council stated in the 
statements entered in the Council minutes on the decision authorising the signature of 
CETA ([2017] OJ L 11/9) regarding decisions of the CETA Joint Committee that ‘where 
a decision of the CETA Joint Committee falls within the competence of the Member 
States the position to be taken by the Union and its Member States within the CETA 
Joint Committee shall be adopted by common accord’ (No 19). The legal base for such a 
common accord can be found in art 218(9) TFEU extended by a political declaration to 
only adopt a decision under this article by unanimity (although it allows for a qualified 
majority voting). 
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Comparable formulations can be found with regard to the adoption of 
mutual recognition agreements by the competent specialised committee 
(Article 11.3(6)), with regard to decisions and recommendations adopted 
by the Committee Services and Investment in relation to the binding 
interpretation of CETA provisions and with regard to the extension of the 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ obligation and modifications of the rules of 
procedure of the dispute settlement rules (Article 8.44(3)).12 Furthermore, 
the specialised committees adopt their decisions by consensus. 
The decision-making rights of CETA bodies are hence legitimised by 
the contracting parties in two ways: ex ante through the delegation of 
powers in the Treaty text, which is to be ratified by the contracting parties, 
and ex post through an approval of decisions adopted by the Treaty bodies. 
This approval is given in accordance with the respective internal rules of 
the contracting parties. Looking at the EU, the concrete implementation 
of the appoval is still unclear. In the proposal for a Council Decision on 
signing CETA on behalf of the EU the European Commission simply re-
fers to ‘the EU’s internal legal process’ when commenting on the control 
of the CETA Joint Committee by the EU as a ‘contracting party’.13 Yet, 
an indication on how the EU intends to proceed when it has to approve 
decisions of the CETA committees can be found in Article 2 of Council 
Decision on the provisional application of CETA, according to which 
‘[f]or the purposes of Article 20.22 of the Agreement, modifications to 
Annex 20-A of the Agreement through decisions of the CETA Joint 
 
12 Especially, the procedure for the adopting the extension of the scope of the ‘fair 
and equitable treatment’ obligation is a ‘good’ example that shows how complicated the 
decision-making in CETA is and how hidden the procedural protection of the parties is. 
Under art 8.10(3) the CETA Joint Committee adopts any extension of the ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ obligation. The limitations of art 26.3(2) do not clearly indicate 
whether this decision is subject to an approval by the parties (which depends on whether 
there are any internal requirements of the parties in relation to this extension that are to 
be respected). Yet, the CETA Joint Committee can only adopt this decision upon a 
recommendation of the Committee Services and Investment (art 8.10(3)), which may only 
issue this recommendation, according to art 8.44(3)(d), ‘on agreement of the parties’. This 
clarifies that any changes of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ obligation are subject to 
the agreement of the parties. But this requirement is quite hidden in the procedural rules 
of the ch 8. 
13 ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing on behalf of the European Union 
of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada of the one part, 
and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part’ COM(2016) 444 final 
(5 July 2016) 7. 
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Committee shall be approved by the Commission on behalf of the Un-
ion’.14 This provision seemingly insinuates that the approval on behalf of 
the EU will be given by the Commission without any further procedural 
requirements involving the Council or the European Parliament. The 
same ambiguity can be found in relation to the voting of the representa-
tives of the EU in the committees when taking decisions ‘by mutual con-
sent’.  
 
 
3. Interim assessment of the CETA governance structure and its decision-
making powers 
 
At first sight, it seems indeed remarkable that the CETA Treaty 
bodies have the power to amend the Treaty and to adopt decisions that 
are legally binding upon the contracting parties. Yet, a comparable 
governance structure with comparable powers can already be found in 
other trade agreements that the EU has concluded with third countries. 
For example, in the Economic Partnership Agreement with Mexico15 the 
Joint Council has the power to take binding decisions (Article 47) and to 
set up specialised committees (Article 49). The same holds true for other 
agreements such as the Association Agreement with Chile16 and its 
Association Council (Article 5), the Trade Agreement with Colombia and 
Peru17 and its Trade Committee (Article 14(2)) or the Agreement with 
Central America18 and its Association Council (Article 6(2)), as well as 
for the Association Agreement with Ukraine19 and its Association 
Council (Article 463 including the right to amend the annexes of the 
 
14 Council Decision (EU) 2017/38 on the provisional application of CETA [2017] 
OJ L 11/1080. 
15 Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement 
between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
United Mexican States, of the other part [2000] OJ L 276/45. 
16 Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part [2002] OJ L 
352/3. 
17 Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one 
part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part [2012] OJ L 354/3. 
18 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its 
Member States, on the one hand, and Central America on the other [2012] OJ L 346/3. 
19 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of 
the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part [2014] OJ L 161/3. 
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Treaty), the Free Trade Agreement with the Republic of Korea20 and its 
Trade Committee (Article 15.4(2) including the right to amend the 
annexes, appendices, protocols and notes to this Treaty, Article 15.5(2)) 
or the envisaged Free Trade Agreement with Singapore21 and its Trade 
Committee (Article 17.4 including the right to amend the Treaty, Article 
17.5(2)), which are all quite similar to the governance structure and the 
kind of powers conferred upon it under CETA. 
From the perspective of EU law, the Union is allowed to conclude 
international treaties that provide for own bodies with a delegated 
decision-making power. In the Opinion 1/76 of 26 April 1977 on the 
‘Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland 
waterway vessels’, the European Court of Justice ruled that the EU ‘has 
the power, while observing the provisions of the [EU] Treaty, to 
cooperate with [a third] country in setting up an appropriate organism 
[… and] may also, in this connexion, cooperate with a third country for 
the purpose of giving the organs of such an institution appropriate 
powers of decision’.22 Article 218(9) TFEU provides in relation to 
associaton agreements with third countries that the Council shall adopt a 
decision ‘establishing the positions to be adopted on the Union’s behalf 
in a body set up by an agreement, when that body is called upon to adopt 
acts having legal effects, with the exception of acts supplementing or 
amending the institutional framework of the agreement’, which is obvi-
ously based on the assumption that the creation of such bodies is legal 
under EU law. The decisions of treaty bodies form, furthermore, ‘in the 
same way as the Agreement itself, […] an integral part, as from their entry 
into force, of the Community legal system’.23 
Also from the perspective of public international law, the legal 
possibility to establish treaty bodies and a delegation of decision-making 
powers to them is commonly recognised.24 In principle, treaty bodies are 
 
20 Free trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, [2011] OJ L 127/6. 
21 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of 
Singapore <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961>.  
22 ECJ, Opinion 1/76 [1977] ECR 754 para 5. 
23 ECJ, Case C-192/89 SZ Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR I-3461 
para 9. 
24 See G Ulfstein, ‘Treaty Bodies and Regimes’ in DB Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide 
to Treaties (OUP 2012) 428, 435-437. 
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established in order to ensure the proper implementation of the treaty by 
the contracting parties.  Yet, some treaties also provide for secondary 
law-making by treaty bodies and grants them a right to amend the 
treaties. The law of the treaties does not pose an obstacle to the conferral 
of such powers. Article 39 VCLT refers to an ‘agreement’ by the parties 
as the condition for amending a treaty and does not require an equal act 
(an ‘acte contraire’). Amendment procedures can therefore differ from 
the procedures necessary to the conclusion of the original treaty. 
Furthermore, the VCLT rules are of residual nature with regard to the 
amendment procedures. Article 39 VCLT allows contracting parties to 
provide for specific rules concerning the amendment of the treaty.25 The 
same applies to the amendments of multilateral treaties under Article 40 
VCLT. Limits for the law-making powers of treaty bodies and conditions 
for their exercise have hence to be found elsewhere. In defining both it 
seems appropriate to refer to the established principles of international 
institutional law.26 Although these principles were developed in view of 
international organisations, when exercising law-making powers treaty 
bodies and international organisations are not that different to each other 
that the use of a different legal technique (concluding a treaty or 
establishing an international organisation) would rule out the 
applicability of international institutional law to the activities of treaty 
bodies.27  
The principles of international institutional law in relation to law-
making are based on the assumption that the contracting parties 
delegated powers of theirs to the body entrusted with the task to adopt 
legally binding decisions. On this basis the most important principle to 
be looked at when assessing the law-making activities of treaty bodies is 
the principle of attribution, according to which treaty bodies may only 
act within the boundaries of the powers conferred upon them by the 
contracting parties and within the limits set by the objectives of treaty 
 
25 ME Villiger, Article 39 in ME Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) paras 9-11; A Aust, Modern 
Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, CUP 2013), 233-234. 
26 Villiger (n 25) 428-429. On international institutional law: HG Schermers, NM 
Blokker, International Institutional Law (5th edn, Martinus Nijhoff 2011); J Klabbers, An 
Introduction to International Institutional Law (2nd edn, CUP 2009). 
27 Villiger (n 25) 429. 
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that established these bodies.28 In other words, the adoption of a decision 
must not only be based on a legal base in a treaty but also be necessary to 
realise the purpose of the treaty as it is defined by its objectives.29 
Inherent to the idea of powers for treaty bodies being delegated by the 
contracting parties is the obligation to respect state sovereignty, which 
means that decisions must limit their interference with the contracting 
parties’ sovereignty to the absolute minimum.30 Finally, decisions 
adopted by treaty bodies may not violate ius cogens.31 
Applying these criteria to the governance structure of CETA as 
described in section 2 seems not to lead to any particular legal problems. 
CETA apparently  only carries forward what is already well-established 
in the EU’s practice in concluding trade agreements. Before discussing 
this finding in section 5, we have first to take a step back and look, in 
more general terms, at the purpose for creating bodies such as the CETA 
Joint Committee in international treaties. At a more abstract level, treaty 
bodies take over tasks that would otherwise be exercised by the 
contracting parties on an ad hoc basis. It appears therefore useful to 
identify the purpose for creating treaty bodies and to re-assess the 
responsibilities conferred upon them in CETA as compared to the past 
practice against the background of this purpose. 
 
 
4. Purpose for creating treaty bodies 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, creating treaty bodies endowed 
with decision-making powers is not unknown in EU law and in interna-
tional law. Reasons for states to create treaty bodies were found in bal-
ancing the need for centralised implementation of treaty obligations, on 
 
28 Schermers, Blokker (n 26) paras 206, 209-210; Klabbers (n 26) 56; PCIJ, 
Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila, 
Advisory Opinion [1926] Series B, no 14, 64. 
29 ICJ, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflicts, Advisory 
Opinion, [1996] ICJ Reports 66. 
30 This could also be called the ‘principle of subsidiarity’, see M Benzing, 
‘International Organizations or Institutions, Secondary Law’, in R Wolfrum (ed.), Max 
Planck Encyclopaedia of Public Intl L (OUP, March 2007) 
<opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL>.  
31 In analogy to art 53 VCLT. 
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the one hand, and to keep the interference in states’ sovereignty to a min-
imum, on the other.32 Creating treaty bodies reflects some form of ‘legal-
ization’33 of the international relationship between states. By concluding 
a treaty, the contracting parties express their intention to be legally 
bound by the rules of the treaty. In order to amplify their commitments 
in a legal way, contracting parties chose to delegate the ‘authority to im-
plement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) 
to make further rules’34 to a designated third party, a treaty body. To 
achieve this goal, states could also establish an international organisation. 
This might, however, appear to the contracting parties as more costly and 
less effective so that they opt for treaty bodies.35 
The main reason for creating treaty bodies seems hence to be found 
in the domain of implementation of treaty obligations. Further reasons 
beyond implementation can be found when looking at the extensive use 
of committees composed of representatives of the Member States in the 
EU, the so-called ‘comitology’.36 The creation of ‘comitology’ was origi-
nally based on the intent to include national bureaucracies in the process 
of ‘fine-tuning’ EU secondary law.37 On the one hand, when delegating 
such powers to the Commission, being a supranational institution inde-
pendent from the national governments, the Member States wanted to 
get their bureaucracies involved into this process in order to restrain the 
use of these powers by the Commission. On the other hand, involving 
national bureaucrats instead of national governments in solving specific 
issues ‘de-politicized’ decision-making and allowed for taking decisions 
at the level of the detail that were difficult to reach at the abstract political 
level in the Council.38  
 
32 Ulfstein (n 24) 429. 
33 KW Abbot, RO Keohane, A Moravcsik, AM Slaughter, D Snidal, ‘The Concept 
of Legalization’ (2000) 54 Intl Organization 401-419. 
34 ibid 401. 
35 G Ulfstein, ‘Institutions and Competences’ in J Klabbers, A Peters, G Ulfstein 
(eds), Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009) 49. 
36 P Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP 2012) ch 5, Comitology, 109-139; C 
Joerges, E Vos (eds), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Hart 1999). 
37 Craig (n 36) 113-115. 
38 C Joerges, J Neyer, ‘From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political 
Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology’ (1997) 3 Eur L J 273-299 call this 
phenomenon ‘deliberative supranationalism’, in which ‘national regulators are exposed 
to transnational arenas scrutinising the validity of their arguments’ (at 297). 
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The latter point is also relevant when finding the purpose for creating 
treaty bodies in general. Delegating decisions to committees that need to 
be approved but not to be ratified by the contracting parties takes the 
respective issue off the political agenda and brings it into an arena of bu-
reaucratic experts. The transnational embedding of this arena leads fur-
thermore to a change of perspective. The concrete issue at stake is then 
less discussed around the national interests represented by governments 
but around the transnational interest reunited in the treaty body.39 
Joerges and Neyer have shown with regard to the EU ‘comitology’ that 
national representatives in the specialised committees at EU level tend to 
call their originally national policy preferences into question in searching 
for an EU solution.40 Generalising this finding in relation to treaty bodies 
shows that another reason for creating those bodies can be found in the 
easing of international decision-making processes. Delegating powers to 
treaty bodies can lead to a higher likelihood of finding compromises de-
tached from national interests. 
In sum, one can conclude that two main reasons form the purpose 
for creating treaty bodies. They, first, serve to improve the implementa-
tion of treaty commitments as a form of ‘legalization’ of the international 
relationship between the contracting parties. Second, by creating a trans-
national forum of bureaucracies underneath the political level, compli-
cated policy-making processes at governments’ level are eased through a 
relativisation of national interests. 
 
 
5. CETA: Nothing new under the sun? 
 
Taking up on CETA again and having the interim assessment of its 
governance structure and the decision-making powers conferred upon it 
in section 3 in mind, can we conclude that with CETA there is actually 
nothing new under the sun? At first sight, the answer seems to be in the 
affirmative.  
Yet, although when simply looking at the form both the governance 
 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid 297-298; C Joerges, ‘Good Governance through Comitology, in C Joerges, E 
Vos (eds), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Hart 1999) 318. 
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structure and the law-making powers in CETA are in line with require-
ments set by EU and international law, one should not isolate form from 
substance. What makes CETA different from previous contractual trade 
arrangements concluded by the EU is its scope, being a so-called ‘mega-
regional agreement’. The scope of CETA is comprehensive in the sense 
that it covers not only tariff barriers but also non-tariff barriers to trade 
in goods and services. It contains rules on subsidies, investments, move-
ment and professional qualifications of natural persons, telecommunica-
tions, intellectual property, labour rights and environmental protection. 
CETA employs furthermore for the first time in an EU trade agreement 
a ‘negative list’ approach, according to which all non-conforming 
measures of the contracting parties that are not enlisted in one of the 
annexes are subject to the CETA liberalisation requirements. Commit-
tees created by previous EU trade agreements had, indeed, already deci-
sion-making powers but with a very limited scope. The conferral of pow-
ers upon these ‘old generation’ committees41 appears against the back-
ground of the scope of these arrangements to be rather selective and nar-
row. In CETA, the CETA Joint Committee and the eleven specialised 
committees cover much more subject-matters than in any other previous 
EU trade agreement. This brings up the question whether the extended 
scope affects to the assessment of the CETA governance structure and its 
decision-making powers. 
For the reply to this question, the purpose for creating treaty bodies, 
as set out in section 4, has to be taken into account. As shown above, 
treaty bodies are supposed to, first, intensify the ‘legalization’ of the in-
ternational relationship between the contracting parties and to, second, 
depoliticise the international decision-making in relation to single issues. 
Especially having regard to the latter element, there is a trade-off between 
the efficiency of international decision-making through depoliticisation 
and the legitimacy of the decisions taken by treaty bodies. Decisions by 
treaty bodies are legitimised by the delegation of powers as a part of the 
ratification of the treaty and by the subsequent approval of the contract-
ing parties (provided that there is such an approval requirement) in ac-
cordance with their respective internal rules.  
If there are only some very few decisions, the legitimacy provided for 
 
41 It should be recalled, as mentioned in section 3, that sometimes previous trade 
agreements even created only one committee. 
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these decisions by delegation and approval might seem to be sufficient. 
Yet, if the total amount of treaty body decisions increases significantly, it 
becomes questionable whether delegation and approval provide for suf-
ficient legitimacy and additional measures are needed in order to ensure 
sufficient legitimacy of the treaty governance system. This trade-off de-
rives from the impact of treaty body decisions on the domestic legal order 
of the contracting parties. Being a part of public international law, treaty 
body decisions rank above ordinary domestic law (in the EU law context: 
underneath primary law but above secondary law). Hence, in the event 
of a conflict of rules, treaty obligations trump domestic rules. Although 
CETA rules have no direct effect (Article 30.6), non-compliance with 
treaty obligations (as specified or further developed by treaty body deci-
sions) can still give rise to claims of the other contracting party under the 
chapter on dispute settlement (suspension of treaty obligations or com-
pensation, Article 29.14(1)). The more there are treaty obligations, whose 
content is unknown ex ante at the time of the ratification of the treaty 
text because of a delegation of powers, the more there is a need for an 
effective ex post control of these decisions by the legislative organs of the 
contracting parties. Applying this line of reasoning to CETA reveals that 
the comprehensive scope of this Agreement and the amount of twelve 
treaty bodies that are empowered to adopt legally binding decisions or to 
amend the annexes of the Agreement give rise to serious doubts as to the 
legitimacy of the governance structure and the delegation of decision-
making upon it.42 
The identified serious doubts imply two possible consequences. Ei-
ther the scope of delegated decision-making powers on bodies in com-
prehensive trade agreements should be limited or mechanisms that en-
sure an enhanced legitimacy of the decisions taken by these treaty bodies 
 
42 See also PT Stoll, TP Holterhus, H Gött, ‘Die geplante 
Regulierungszsuammenarbeit zwischen der Europäischen Union und Kanada sowie den 
USA nach den Entwürfen von CETA und TTIP’ Rechtsgutachten erstellt im Auftrag der 
Arbeiterkammer Wien (June 2016) 24 referring to the fact that CETA is supposed to be 
a ‘living instrument’, which requires a higher degree of democratic legitimisation than 
standard international Treaties; see as well EU Petersmann, ‘Democratic Legitimacy of 
the CETA and TTIP Agreements?’ in T Rensmann (ed), Mega-Regional Trade 
Agreements (Springer 2017) 37-60; E Benvenisti, ‘Democracy Captured: The  Mega-
Regional Agreements and the Future of Global Public Law’ (2016) 23 Constellations 58-
70. 
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should be established. Both consequences will be addressed in the fol-
lowing sections starting with a discussion of the need for a broad range 
of decision-making powers conferred upon treaty bodies in order to dy-
namise trade agreements with a view to effectively regulate economic 
globalisation followed by some reflections on ensuring democratic legit-
imacy when dynamising comprehensive trade agreements. 
 
 
6. Looking at the broader picture: Regulating globalisation needs dy-
namisation 
 
After having concluded the previous section with a critical assessment 
of CETA’s governance structure and of the broad range of decision-mak-
ing powers delegated to it, it has to be discussed whether there is not a 
need for concluding comprehensive trade agreements such as CETA and 
for creating an extensive governance structure with own decision-making 
rights. This discussion has to be embedded into the broader picture of 
the regulation of economic globalisation by means of trade agreements 
between the world’s leading trade nations, the so-called ‘mega-regionals’. 
Mega-regionals can be defined as ‘deep integration partnerships in 
the form of [regional trade agreements] between countries or regions 
with a major share of world trade and [foreign direct investments] and in 
which two or more of the parties are in a paramount driver position, or 
serve as hubs, in global value chains’.43 They emerged as a reaction to 
three developments, which are interlinked with each other. The first one 
is the shift in international trade law from opening markets for goods 
(reducing trade barriers that occur when crossing borders such as tariffs 
and rules of origin) to reducing non-tariff barriers for goods and services 
located behind the borders: ‘20th century trade is about “made-here-
sold-there” goods. […] Twenty-first century trade is about “made-every-
where-sold-there” goods’.44 The second one is a shift from reducing dis-
criminations based on the origin of a product to reducing regulatory costs 
 
43 R Meléndez-Ortiz, ‘Mega-regionals: What is Going On?’ in World Economic 
Forum, Mega-regional Trade Agreements: Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the 
World Trading System? (Report 2014) 13. 
44 R Baldwin, ‘Multilateralising 21st Century Regionalism, Global Forum on Trade: 
Reconciling Regionalism and Multilateralism in a Post-Bali World, Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’ (OECD 2014) 3. 
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linked to differences in legal orders that are equally applicable to domes-
tic and foreign products.45 The third one is the failure of the Doha Round 
and, by that, of WTO multilateralism to address the first two strands of 
development in a multilateral forum.46 As a consequence, significant 
trade countries and regions decided to address the challenges of globali-
sation bilaterally with other countries (such as CETA or TTIP) or multi-
laterally with a group of countries (such as TPP) but outside the WTO 
framework. Against this background the comprehensive scope of this 
new generation of regional free trade agreements is explainable as they 
intend to address the challenges of the first two strands of developments 
in international trade. 
Addressing non-discriminatory regulation behind the borders aims, 
as shortly mentioned above, at minimising regulatory costs for market 
operators. The necessity to take regulation ‘behind the borders’ into con-
sideration when concluding trade agreements derives from the dynamics 
of economic globalisation. These dynamics can be very briefly and, by 
that, very superficially illustrated by comparing the world economy in the 
20th century with the one in the 21st century.47 In the 20th century world 
economy production factors were mainly immobile and, by that, national 
so that trade focussed on the exchange of products. Comparative ad-
vantages were national and trade surplus was generated when a national 
economy concentrated on producing goods and services in the domain 
where its comparative advantage is located. Hence trade agreements fo-
cussed on the costs that emerged when crossing the border. In the 21st 
century world economy production factors are mobile in such a way that a 
product is produced in a production chain that combines through ‘offshor-
ing’ and the use of new technologies comparative advantages of a multi-
tude of national economies (production unbundling). Products don’t re-
 
45 B Hoekman, ‘Fostering Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and Gradual 
Multilateralization’ (2015) 18 Journal of International Economic Law, 609, 612. 
46 W Yong, ‘The Political Economy of the Rise of Mega-regionals’ in World 
Economic Forum, Mega-regional Trade Agreements: Game-Changers or Costly 
Distractions for the World Trading System? (Report 2014) 20; LA Winters, ‘The WTO 
and Regional Trading Agreements – Is It All Over for Multilateralism?’ in M Elsig, B 
Hoekman, J Pauwelyn (eds), Assessing the World Trade Organization: Fit for Purpose? 
(CUP 2017) 344, 359. 
47 This follows the analysis made by Baldwin (n 44) 17-24. 
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flect anymore single national economies but an array of national econo-
mies. In other words, a product already crossed a couple of borders in the 
process of its creation. Producers make therefore, in the context of the 21st 
century globalisation, use of diverging regulatory regimes behind the bor-
ders and trigger a regulatory competition between national regulators. 
Trade agreements that in such an environment remain focussed on 
trade barriers that emerge when crossing the border fail to address the 
challenges of economic globalisation, which are to be found behind the 
borders. Including regulation behind the borders into the scope of trade 
agreements embodies significant risks. Once subject to liberalisation re-
quirements understood as ‘mutual recognition of standards’ domestic 
regulation runs the risk of a race to the bottom.48 In order to avoid such 
harmful race to the bottom, an international coordination of regulatory 
standards is key. It is worth to mention at this point that reducing regu-
latory costs because of diverging regulatory regimes does not, by defini-
tion, entail a lowering of all regulatory standards to the lowest common 
denominator. It does only require that there is a level playing field, which 
can also be at a high standard. In order to achieve such a level playing 
field in a dynamic globalised world, targeted and quick decision-making 
of major trading partners is needed. This task can only be assumed by 
treaty bodies with delegated decision-making powers. 
This quick reflection shows that the comprehensive scope of CETA, 
its governance structure and the broad range of decision-making powers 
delegated to CETA bodies by the contracting parties is, from a govern-
ance point of view, an appropriate answer to the challenges posed by 21st 
century economic globalisation to regulation behind the borders. It 
should be noted that none of the decision-making powers conferred 
upon CETA bodies entails any kind of harmonisation of the regulatory 
standards of the contracting parties. Both Canada and the EU remain 
legally free to adopt and to modify their own regulation behind the bor-
ders. Therefore the CETA governance structure represents only what 
could be considered as an embryo of how an effective trade governance 
in response to globalisation could look like. 
 
48 It should be noted that CETA does not contain any mutual recognition of 
standards provision except for the recognition of the United Nations Regulations in the 
field of motor vehicle safety (cf. art 4 of Annex 4-A) and for professional qualifications 
subject to the future conclusion of mutual recognition agreements (ch 11). 
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This tour d’horizon through the challenges of economic globalisation 
has shown that the more economic interdependencies there are across 
regulatory orders, the more a comprehensive and dynamised interna-
tional cooperation between the affected countries and regions is needed. 
An extensive treaty governance structure including decision-making 
rights is a necessary element of such an international cooperation. CETA 
represents a first idea for a dynamised international cooperation. Having 
established that there is a need for comprehensive and dynamised inter-
national cooperation between trading partners in order to address the 
challenges of economic globalisation, the discussion must consequently 
focus on how democratic legitimacy of such an international cooperation 
could be achieved. 
 
 
7.  Ensuring democratic legitimacy in dynamising ‘Mega-Regionals’ 
 
Admittedly, finding a convincing reply to the challenge of ensuring 
democratic legitimacy in dynamised ‘mega-regionals’ is complicated. It is 
embedded into the broader discussion on the democratic deficit of inter-
national law, which has been called – for a good reason – ‘one of the 
central questions – perhaps the central question – in contemporary world 
politics’.49 The Harvard economist Dani Rodrik considered it even im-
possible to ‘simultaneously pursue democracy, national determination, 
and economic globalization’.50 National determination must in this con-
text be understood as the ability to set costly protection standards. This 
derives from the fact that Rodrik dismisses what he calls ‘the global gov-
ernance option’, which combines the benefits of economic globalisation 
with democracy at the expense of national sovereignty.51 The argument 
for his dismissal is the diversity of opinions as to the desired level of pro-
tection at the global level:  
 
 
49 A Moravcsik, ‘Is there a “Democratic Deficit” in World Politics? A Framework 
for Analysis’ (2004) 39 Government and Opposition 336–363. 
50 D Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States and Democracy 
can’t coexist (OUP 2012) xviii; see in particular ch 9 of the book on the ‘Political 
Trilemma of World Economy’ 184-206. 
51 ibid 203. 
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‘Global standards and regulations are not just impractical; they are un-
desirable. The democratic legitimacy constraint virtually ensures that 
global governance will result in the lowest common denominator, a re-
gime of weak and ineffective rules’.52  
 
In other words, ‘formal’ democracy (understood as the implementation 
of democratic, viz. voting, procedures) disconnected from national sov-
ereignty won’t be able to adopt regulation that is comparably hard as in 
a national context and hence not be able to effectively legitimise decisions 
taken by a governance structure beyond the nation-state. 
Rigorously applied to the ‘mega-regionals’, this reasoning would mean 
that democratic legitimacy of a dynamised international cooperation aim-
ing at regulating globalisation is not feasible. A rigorous application of this 
reasoning to ‘mega-regionals’ would, however, ignore the distinctive fea-
ture of ‘mega-regionals’ from global trade cooperation, which is that it only 
covers a group of states and not the global community. This distinctive 
feature is important when we look at the reason why Rodrik dismisses the 
global governance option: The diversity of opinions as to the desired level 
of protection vis-à-vis economic transactions. The less diverse the opinions 
are amongst the states joining a ‘mega-regional’, the more a democratic le-
gitimacy of a governance structure beyond national sovereignty becomes 
imaginable. Considering at hand a mega-regional involving Canada and the 
EU, the diversity in relation to protection standards is, by and large, mini-
mal enough that CETA could serve as a basis for an attempt to ensure 
democratic legitimacy beyond the nation state.53 
This leads to the follow-up reflection as to how democratic legitimacy 
could be ensured. This reflection is to be made in view of the particular 
legal context of ‘mega-regionals’, which is public international law. As 
Anne Peters pointed out when addressing the issue of the democratic 
deficit in international law:  
 
‘domestic democratic procedures cannot simply be zoned up. The type, 
shape, and procedures of democracy cannot and need not be identical 
 
52 ibid 204. 
53 Furthermore, it should be recalled that, when it comes to market regulation, the 
EU is a good example that market governance beyond the nation-state is possible when 
the basic convictions of the participating states as to the desired level of protection are 
not too much divergent. 
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on both levels of governance [state and supra-state; note from the au-
thor]. Moreover, the complementarity and interaction of various levels 
of governance inevitably transforms the domestic ways of democracy as 
well’.54  
 
The discussion on the improvement of the democratic legitimacy of in-
ternational law can here only briefly be reconstructed. Basically two 
strands of opinions can be distinguished: Those that seek to increase the 
democratic quality of international decision-making in informal ways and 
those that favour the establishment of formal democratic procedures. 
The first strand includes the model of ‘deliberative democracy’55, of ‘par-
ticipatory democracy’56 and of ‘contestatory democracy’.57 Common to 
all three models is the absence of formal voting at international level, 
which is to be substituted either by the mere presence of deliberations, 
by the inclusion of citizens and non-governmental organisations in the 
deliberations or by the possibility for the people to contest decisions 
taken in deliberations at international level. The second strand criticises 
the lack of formal democracy in the proposals of the first strand and con-
siders this lack as the core issue of the democratic deficit.58 Proponents 
of a formal democratisation of international governance suggest a two-
track model of ‘dual democracy’.59 International action is here legiti-
mised, first, via the participating states to citizens and, second, through 
direct democratic action on the international level. The two-track model 
is based on the assumption that even if all states participating in an inter-
national relationship act like perfect democracies, the international rela-
tionship itself must still be democratically legitimate. The first track re-
quires the respect of domestic democratic procedures by involving na-
tional Parliaments at an earlier stage of international negotiations60 and 
 
54 A Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in J Klabbers, A Peters, G Ulfstein (eds), 
Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009) 263. 
55 J Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy (OUP 2000). 
56 C Petman, Participation and Democratic Theory (CUP 1970). 
57 L Quill, Liberty after Liberalism: Civic Republicanism in a Global Age (Palgrave 
2006). 
58 See notably Peters (n 54) 270-271. 
59 ibid 265; D Archibugi, D Held, ‘Editors’ Introduction’ in D Archibugi, D Held 
(eds), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (Polity Press 
Cambridge 1995) 1-16. 
60 Peters (n 54) 291. 
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of renewing Parliamentary consent when ‘blanket permissions’ are given 
to International Organisations or Treaty bodies.61 The second track 
would involve transnational (as a first step consultative) referenda,62 the 
establishment of Parliamentary assemblies63 and more transparency.64  
Public contestation of the CETA negotiations and of the draft Treaty 
text and the unaltered public opposition to CETA after its formal signa-
ture show that public support for (and linked to that the democratic le-
gitimacy of) ‘mega-regionals’ won’t increase by the inclusion of forms of 
democracy into ‘mega-regionals’ that focus on ‘voice’ (as suggested by 
the first strand of ideas) and not on ‘vote’. The ‘CETA case’ has shown 
that ‘mega-regionals’ must include formal democracy following the lines 
of the two-track model in order to increase their democratic legitimacy. 
Admittedly, for the time being, it seems quite ambitious to create a CETA 
Parliamentary Assembly and to introduce a ‘second track’ of dual democ-
racy into CETA. It also appears not to be strictly necessary against the 
fact that the CETA Treaty bodies have currently only limited decision-
making powers. Yet, an improved involvement of domestic Parliaments 
in the approval of decisions adopted by CETA Treaty bodies in a sense 
that they can veto the entry into force of these decisions and, by that, a 
strengthening of the ‘first track’ of the dual democracy in international 
law seems highly recommendable in order to tackle the democratic legit-
imacy gap identified in section 5. 
If, however, in the future ‘mega-regionals’ are supposed to be further 
developed into effective and dynamic tools to regulate economic global-
isation, as described in section 6, the introduction of a second track of 
dual democracy is indispensable. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
Mega-regional trade agreements represent the latest attempt of states 
to shape and to impact economic globalisation through international co-
operation. They pursue a threefold goal: Increasing economic benefits 
 
61 ibid 294. 
62 ibid 318-319. 
63 ibid 322-326. 
64 ibid 326-330. 
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for the participating countries through the reduction of non-tariff barri-
ers to trade and investments ‘behind the borders’; consolidating regional 
cooperation for geopolitical purposes and strengthening the regulatory 
capacity of the participating countries through elevating the setting of 
regulatory standards at the international level.65 In realising this goal, 
mega-regionals have to be able to react to market developments at the 
global level and to regulatory developments within the participating 
states. In order to serve their purpose, these agreements have to be dy-
namic. Such dynamisation can be achieved by joint committees of the par-
ticipating countries equipped with decision-making rights. The CETA 
committee system represents an embryo of how a well-functioning govern-
ance structure of mega-regionals could look like. Yet, the more decision-
making rights are delegated from national lawmakers to transnational 
treaty bodies, the more there is a need to ensure the democratic legitimacy 
when making use of delegated powers. This requires, at the national level 
of the participating states, a better inclusion of national Parliaments in the 
ex post control of such decisions. But also at the level of the international 
cooperation the delegation of extensive powers calls for an own mecha-
nism to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the treaty bodies’ actions. The 
establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly would be recommendable. 
As regards CETA and its governance, an enhanced inclusion in the 
ex post control of CETA committee decisions of the Parliaments of the 
contracting parties appears to be sufficient to close the detected demo-
cratic deficit because of its comprehensive scope. The powers currently 
conferred upon CETA bodies are more extensive than in any previous 
EU trade agreement but not so extensive it would require democratic 
control at CETA level.  
In brief, mega-regionals such as CETA are instruments that can en-
hance the protection of citizens in times of globalisation when used ac-
cordingly. But they can also lead to the opposite policy result. To avoid 
the latter and to hold actors to account in the event the latter should ma-
terialise, effective democratic control is essential.  
 
65 RB Stewart, ‘State Regulatory Capacity and Administrative Law and Governance 
Under Globalization’ in NR Parillo (ed), Administrative Law from the Inside Out (CUP 
2017) 451, 478-481. 
